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The qualitative character of consciousness, its “what-it-is-likeness”, is a contested issue,
both in philosophy and psychology. I argue that, rather than by conceptual analyses,
the status of “what-it-is-likeness” has to be decided by empirical investigation. Pending
the outcome, we should maintain an agnostic stance, in order to remove the bias in
favor of fictionalism from our study of consciousness,. I illustrate this with the notion of
“ownership unity”. People adhere to the belief of a single, unified self as the owner of
their experiences, in spite of abundant dis-unities in the informational content of their
experience. On one reading, this supports the notion that the unity of experience is
no more than a convenient fiction, based on an illusory experience of unity. Cognitive
neuroscience is slanted in favor of such understanding, insofar it emphasizes functional
specialization and localization. To restore the balance, I present a complementary
perspective: the view that the experience of unity is afforded by the intrinsic, multiscale
brain dynamics. This approach offers a biological substrate for unity of experience as a
regular scenario within certain boundary conditions, as well mechanisms that may let it
go astray.
Keywords: phenomenal experience, hard problem, personal identity, selfhood, philosophy of mind, theories of
consciousness, brain diseases, cognitive neuroscience
Introduction
‘‘Whatever is the lot of humankind
I want to taste within my deepest self.
I want to seize the highest and the lowest,
to load its woe and bliss upon my breast,
and thus expand my single self titanically
and in the end go down with all the rest.’’
—Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Faust: First Part1
From its inception as a scientific discipline, the main focus of psychology has long been on
consciousness (Wundt and Pintner, 1912); this lasted its methods were deemed unscientific by
behaviorism. Even though many still recently believed consciousness to lie outside of the scope
of scientific explanation (Fodor, 2000) or denied its existence altogether (Dennett, 1992), heralds
of a new dawn such as Baars (1988, 1997) have brought it back to the forefront of psychology and
1 The English translations of Faust quotes were found at http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Goethe%27s_Faust (downloaded
19-6-2014) or https://www.goodreads.com/work/quotes/16721-faust (downloaded 26-02-2015).
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 1 April 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 170
van Leeuwen Agnosticist manifesto
related sciences. To date, cognitive neuroscientists study
brain states as ‘‘correlates’’ of, mostly what Rosenthal (1986)
called transitive consciousness, or consciousness of something,
using brain imaging techniques including fMRI, EEG, or
MEG, Behavioral and clinical neuroscience study intransitive
consciousness (Rosenthal, 1986), offering tools for inducingmild,
temporary alterations to conscious states, such as TMS or tDCS,
and are investigating more dramatic changes such as anesthesia
or coma. Psychophysicists offered methods such as signal
detection to study what we are able or unable to consciously
detect. Experimental psychologists have contributed methods
such as change blindness and attentional blink paradigms, to
study ‘‘lapses of conscious experience’’. This flurry of activity
has led to an abundance of experimental results and a major
demystification of consciousness.
While the interest in consciousness is widespread, there is
the nagging suspicion that our scientific studies leave something
out of the equation. When talking about consciousness, we
distinguish processes such as visual or auditory recognition
and discrimination, sensory experience, reasoning and
decision-making, as well as properties we ascribe to them,
such as ‘‘ownership unity’’, ‘‘egocentric perspectivity’’, agency,
contentfulness, but seem to be ignoring its ‘‘qualitative character’’
(Welshon, 2013)—the latter, following Nagel’s famous paper
(Nagel, 1974), titled ‘‘What is it like to be a bat?’’ is sometimes
being addressed, somewhat tongue-in-cheek, as ‘‘what-is-it-
likeness’’—a term I will adopt here, if only for the sake of
reappropriation.
Whereas hardly any of consciousness’ properties are a
complete mystery any more, ‘‘what-is-it-likeness’’ remains
elusive. Not surprisingly, it is this the opponents of consciousness
are most eager to drop from their lexicon. ‘‘What-is-it-likeness’’
is what David Chalmers (1996) called the ‘‘hard problem’’of
consciousness. Here I will discuss whether we have reasons
to believe that ‘‘what-is-it-likeness’’ is for real. I will first
consider what philosophers have to say about this subject. After
concluding that philosophy cannot secure its status, it becomes
clear that this a matter of empirical investigation. Here I will
observe that even though recent evidence may seem slanted
against ‘‘what-it-is-likeness’’, we are best advised to keep an
agnostic stance; after all, ‘‘what-is-it-likeness’’ may have a basis,
for instance in the intrinsic dynamics of our brain. I will describe
my version of this view in some detail.
What Philosophers Have to Say
And so I sit, poor silly man
No wiser now than when I began.
—Faust, lines 358–359
While confronting a mechanical and ultimately physical
world, rationalist philosophers have tried to establish
‘‘what-is-it-likeness’’ through intuitive apprehension ‘‘by
a simple act of mental vision’’ (Descartes, as cited in
Hintikka, 1962), of the cognizing ‘‘I’’. In Descartes’ famous
statement: cogito ergo sum, the apprehension of his first
person experience is one of self-evident existence. This may
be considered a case of what psychologists today know as
introspection (which, by the way, may differ from what Wundt
had in mind).
Introspective reports are laden with ambiguities. Schwitzgebel
(2008) highlights ‘‘. . .emotional experience (for example, is
it entirely bodily; does joy have a common, distinctive
phenomenological core?), peripheral vision (how broad and
stable is the region of visual clarity?), and the phenomenology
of thought (does it have a distinctive phenomenology, beyond
just imagery and feelings?)’’. Any effort to our reports by
resolving these ambiguities by reflection is doomed to recede
into armchair theorizing. As Graziano (2014) has succinctly
put it: ‘‘When we introspect and seem to find that ghostly
thing—awareness, consciousness, the way green looks or pain
feels—our cognitive machinery is accessing internal models and
those models are providing information that is wrong. The
machinery is computing an elaborate story about a magical-
seeming property. And there is no way for the brain to
determine through introspection that the story is wrong, because
introspection always accesses the same incorrect information.’’
Indeed, introspection therefore can mislead us in thinking that
our experiences have qualitative character. A radical form of this
position is taken by the later Wittgenstein, who considers all talk
of phenomenal experience a ‘‘myth’’, that doesn’t stand to public
scrutiny.
One might wish to object: likewise as our experience could
not have been right about itself without existing, doesn’t the
fact that it is in error about itself prove its existence? This,
however, is, as Hintikka (1962) points out, is a logical fallacy
that is a consequence of misreading Descartes’ famous dictum.
The fallacy is of the type: Homer must have either been a Greek
or a barbarian. Therefore he must have existed, since if he
was a Greek, he must have existed, and if he was a barbarian,
he must equally have existed. This flaw occurs because first-
order logic typically works with objects that are implied to exist.
As with Homer, the existence the existence of our ‘‘what-is-
it-likeness’’ is at stake, and can thus not be proven by this
syllogism.
Instead, some philosophers have claimed that ‘‘what-is-it-
likeness’’ has a unique way of referencing physical properties
(Loar, 1990). But that doesn’t stand up against scientific
scrutiny. True, psychophysics occasionally produces nice,
apparently lawful relationships between physical and sensory
quantities. But these are rarely stable across individuals or
within individuals over time. Over time the visual system
adjusts its sensivity to what is most relevant to observers
in their environments (Jurica et al., 2013). This may be
called adaptive management of inherently limited resources, or
economizing. From the perspective of economizing systems,
it could be expected that, for instance, visual experience is
often relying on moderately reliable cues. Indeed, in case of
dynamic displays, for instance, Anstis (2010) has demonstrated
that the visual system takes ‘‘ease of perception’’ as a cue
for speed of movement; this observed fact is responsible
for a range of motion illusions. What to make of Loar’s
program in this light? Economizing most likely is not unique
to experiencing subjects; we will find this function up and
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 2 April 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 170
van Leeuwen Agnosticist manifesto
down the ladder of evolution. Referencing physical objects
certainly it isn’t.
Some philosophers might think that the unique way of
referencing is reserved for a certain subclass of phenomena,
such as pain. According to Kripke (1980), pain is a mere
presence; it is what it is to the person. Such an approach
might seem to protect the status of the experience, but in fact
locks it up in a cocoon of dogmatism. Because this way of
referencing is deemed unique to the individual, for a category
of observations it becomes ground truth, and hence these
observations incorrigible. This would be particularly sad news
for a person with phantom limb pain. The person would be told
to live with her incorrigible sensation. In fact, corrective therapy
exists and can boast success, based on what is known about the
plasticity of the sensory-somatic brain map (Ramachandran and
Blakeslee, 1998).
To summarize, introspection and sensation are intrinsically
unreliable in their way of referencing; even sensations claimed
to be mere presences, such as pain are not incorrigible.
An emphasis on reference does not offer a privileged status
to the qualities of phenomenal experience. This offers them
up as candidates for reduction or elimination. Instead, we
might gain a more empirically informed understanding by
emphasizing their functionality in the context of an economizing
system. Such a notion, however, requires giving up all hope of
being able to validate their existence in terms of identifiable
referents.
Then there are those who, following Husserl, propose
a constitutive role for consciousness in our understanding.
Georgalis (2006) develops a theory of representation, in which
representions are of necessity established through the intention
of a conscious being. The intention of the act of referring is
also sufficient, according to Georgalis (2006), even if there is
nothing in the world to satisfy the intention. This might do for
a philosophical theory of representation, but is entirely formal
and sterile from a psychological perspective. The phenomenal
aspects of the act play no role in the postulated logical necessity of
consciousness for establishing representation in the theory. Still,
it will offer a valuable illustration of a point I want to make in the
next section.
We may conclude that neither reference, nor a first-person
analogue to the Fregean concept of sense as proposed by
Georgalis (2006) can establish a need for real, qualitative
phenomenal experience. But perhaps, the role of experience
in our cognitive functions could. However, according to
Chalmers’ (1996) ‘‘philosophical zombie’’ thought experiment,
an individual may exist, at least logically speaking, who
functions in all possible respects in exactly the same way as
a conscious agent does, but who lacks conscious experience.
When questioned, the zombie will claim to have them, falsely but
entirely convincingly. In fact, it has to, as this is exactly what its
non-zombie counterpart would do.
It is worthwile to mention that the logical possibility of such
a zombie does not amount to behaviorism. Behaviorism does
not deny the presence of conscious experience, but claims that
its constituents are behaviors (partly overt, and partly covert,
and some physiology, to account, e.g., for hunger pangs). To
behaviorism, the proposed zombie, who behaves in all possible
ways like a normal individual would effectively be identical
to that individual. In other words, a zombie, according to
behaviorism, cannot exist (Kirk, 1999). Behaviorism, however,
has other problems. Consider, for instance, an individual with
locked-in syndrome: a conscious person bereft of all overt
behavior. Behaviorism must either deny that the person is
genuine consciousness or revert to the claim that all its
components are covert (or physiological), which reduces its
claims to a tautology.
The logical possibility of philosophical zombies permits
a principled skepticism, firstly, with respect to other minds.
This observation gains practical significance in light of our
increasingly frequent conversations with dialog bots, which are
rapidly becoming more and more convincing. We may be
surrounded by bots, or zombies.
The skeptical contagion does not halt at the self. We
have seen that our introspections could be misleading; but
now even worse, the sum total of our experiences could be
delusions. This is hilariously illustrated in a one-page essay by
Smullyan (1980/2002). Loosely paraphrased, it runs as follows:
A philosopher who can not bear the lightness of being decides,
before going to bed, to take a pill that will turn him onto
a philosophical zombie, Next morning when he wakes up he
exclaims: ‘‘Oh s∗∗t! The pill didn’t work!’’ He has to, either
way, hasn’t he? The stubborn certainty about your own first-
person experience is something you share with your Zombie
counterpart. In the same way it is deceiving others it has to be
deceiving itself.
Even if we were all philosophical zombies, this would have
no effect whatsoever on our lives, as all of us will continue to
act as if we possess ‘‘what-is-it-likeness’’, and continue deceiving
ourselves and each other about having it. The upshot is that
it may be a complete epiphenomenon, i.e., it is completely
irrelevant towards the course of events in our lives and at
worst a complete fiction. Thereby the philosophical zombie
argument appears to be cutting through the ties of psychological
explanation and ‘‘what-it-is-likeness.’’
What Psychologists Have to Say
‘‘When scholars study a thing, they strive to kill it first, if it’s alive;
then they have the parts and the’be lost the whole, for the link that’s
missing was the living soul.’’
—Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Faust, Part One
Based on Chalmers’ zombie thought experiment, we
may call ‘‘what-is-it-likeness’’ redundant, or so it seems.
But this is true only if one buys into the philosophical
hubris of it. Remember the definition of a zombie as an
individual in all possible psychological functions identical
to a person with, yet having no qualitative conscious
experience. It uses ‘‘all possible psychological functions’’ as
if it were a well-delineated set. But this could be debated.
What delineates this set cannot be decided apriori and
is to be determined, based on empirical investigation.
Such investigation may determine whether the concept of
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‘‘psychological zombie’’ turns out to be meaningful, because
it is empirically possible that some functions necessitate
qualitative consciousness. And so, as far as ‘‘what-is-it likeness’’
is concerned, the ball is in the court of psychology and its sister
sciences.
Can we envisage any psychological functions that might
necessitate qualitative consciousness? We have seen that
Georgalis (2006) required conscioiusness for representation, but
did not involve its qualitative character. We might, however,
image his definition of representation embedded in the context
of a psychological theory. For instance, I exclaim: ‘‘Oh what
a beautiful flower!’’. According to Georgalis, this constitutes
representation, because it results from an intentional act to
refer by a conscious individual. This, even though the flower
may exist only in my imagination. But if so, what causes
such an expression in a conscious being as such, psychologists
would ask. If the answer is: it must be the quality of the
image as experienced, we have just created a theory of
psychological function in which ‘‘what-is-it-likeness’’ plays an
ineliminable role. This is because it is a formal requirent for
representation, which renders it immune to the zombie thought
experiment.
Should we endorse such a theory, the ball would be back
in the philosophers’ court, as the question would now be how
‘‘what-it-is-likeness’’ can exist in a physical world. Psychologists,
however, even those who are in the consciousness business,
are somewhat reluctant to endorse talk of ‘‘what it is likeness’’.
The problem, however, is, it is closely intertwined with most,
if not all, psychological functions and properties. How we
experience a color depends on the object the color belongs
to, and the context the object is embedded in McCann et al.
(2014), including our beliefs about the object and its context.
Think of how hard it is to detect incongruent playing cards,
e.g., a red five of spades or black 7 of hearts. According to
Welshon (2013): ‘‘. . . part of what conscious experience is like
for me is that it is from an egocentric perspective and unified
as mine; part of what conscious experience is like is that it has
qualitative character; part of what conscious experience is like
is that it is or seems to be about something; and part of what
conscious experience of myself is like is that I am an agent’’
(p. 841). Welshon observes that this interwovenness easily leads
to conflation and that ‘‘what-it-is-likeness’’ should therefore best
be left untouched.
But rather, one could argue, this interwovenness underscores
how central a role ‘‘what-it-is-likeness’’ play in how we
understand ourselves in our everyday lives. This remains true,
even if we are all zombies. We might therefore equally proclaim
that understanding ‘‘what it is likeness’’ is the ultimate goal of
studying consciousness.
The interwovenness with so many of our psychological
functions could even be considered a defining characteristic of
consciousness. According to Baars (1988, 1997), consciousness
is a collection of functions that have global access to, and
provide input for, various more specialized processing systems.
Together, they make up the global workspace of the eponymous
theory. The resource, or resources, these functions share, are
likely to be are strongly interconnected set of components
that, as a system, could enable us to experience ‘‘what-it-is-
likedness’’.
Perhaps another reason for reluctance in addressing ‘‘what-
it-is-likeness’’ is the discrepancy, highlighted by philosophers,
between private certainty (Descartes) and public inaccessibility
(Wittgenstein). We have seen the philosophical match between
them to be undecided.Yet, researchers feel that they may have
to take sides with one or the other. we see phenomenological
doctrines making private certainty the core of their theoretical
commitment vs. mainstream psychology, which seems to have
sided with the accessible.
But exactly because the minds have become so divided
on this issue, an unbiased contribution from science is
desparately wanting. Rather than taking sides, we should
practice agnosticism with respect to the ontological status
of ‘‘what-is-it-likeness’’. Making progress requires suspending
judgment. For science to have the last word, we should proceed
in understanding consciousness through empirical research,
without having in advance either to affirm it as truth or reject it it
as myth.
I will argue that our current knowledge of consciousness
does not decide the status of ‘‘what-is-it-likeness’’. In particular,
I will illustrate this with the property of ownership unity, i.e.,
the sense that you possess a self that owns your experiences,
is of special interest in this debate, because people hold
on to ownership unity despite what appears overwhelming
scientific evidence to the contrary. The experience of unity,
or what someone calls ‘‘self’’, may be no more than the
product of a number of discrete psychological functions. This
might suggest that the experience of unity itself is unreal. I
will argue that such a conclusion would be premature: even
if the unity of experience is a figment of our imagination,
the resilience of of ownership unity may be still have a real
basis. I will argue that the basis may exist in the biology of
our brain.
What Unity is There in Consciousness,
Really?
In me there are two souls, alas, and their
Division tears my life in two.
One loves the world, it clutches her, it binds
Itself to her, clinging with furious lust;
The other longs to soar beyond the dust
Into the realm of high ancestral minds.
—Faust, lines 1110–1115
Some functions that involve conscious experiences, including
imagery, predominantly have sensory components, some involve
our willful actions and thus appear linked to our motoric abilities,
still others appear linguistic or amodal in nature. What binds
them together is the tendency of the subject to identify with
them: these are my thoughts, my sensations, etc. This is what we
experience, and have come to describe, as our self.
Why do we see ourselves as inhabited by a single the arbiter
of our experience and chief commander of our actions? In
a religiously motivated perspective, unity is provided by the
concept of a soul. The precise relation between soul and self
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may vary according to religious persuasion; in a Christian
context the divine aspects of the soul pose certain norms which
the self must reflect. As agnosticists, however, we need not
take such beliefs for granted. We may wonder: why is it one
rather than two, or 20; or, perhaps, wouldn’t a committee
do just as well? According to Dennett (1992), the self is just
a fictional center in a multitude of narratives that convey
our experience. The mere convenience of a fiction does not
explain why we adhere to ownership unity with such great
stubbornness.
The principle that we perceive ourselves as one is hardly
ever violated, except in some cases of extremely dissociative
identity disorder (often a result of severe psychological trauma
involving prolonged abuse and/or neglect in infancy). Extremely
dissociative identity disorder patients show multiple alters,
each of which may claim ownership unity for part of a
person’s experience and biography. These phenomena may well
be controversial. But it is exactly the kinds of controversies
(e.g., whether these personalities genuinely experience these
alters or are they merely deluding themselves and others) that
the agnosticist view has no stake in. What matters is whether they
show the symptoms, have a history that could explain them, and
whether they have a biological basis. For this, see (Perry, 2002;
Teicher, 2002).
We may wish to distinguish between the self as a persistent
unity and the unity of the momentary experience of selfhood.
Dissociative personalities may lack persistent unity but each of
their alters may still have a unified sense of self at a moment-
to-moment basis or, what Stroud (1967) calls the ‘‘psychological
present’’. Theorists have suggested that such a minimal sense
of unity of the self may be necessary to keep ‘‘the ongoing
process of tracking and controlling global bodily properties’’
(Blanke and Mentzinger, 2009, p. 8) and may, therefore, derive
from these processes. According to Welshon (2013), perception,
imagery, interoception and proprioception might also play a role
in establishing such a minimal sense of self.
No matter how richly or sparsely endowed, the minimal self is
not indispensable for having a persistent self (or maximal) sense
of self. Welshon (2013) points to patients with Balint syndrome.
These patients have simultagnosia, a form of visual feature
binding agnosia, who experience events in the world as a set of
discrete snapshots. These phenomena are not uncontested, but
again, from an agnostic point of view we needn’t care. In spite of
the moment-to-moment discontinuities, these patients feel they
own their experiences. Most already had a fully developed sense
of ownership unity before the lesion that led to their symptoms;
Balint syndrome is rarely reported in children. Drummond and
Dutton (2007), however, report a patient with these symptoms as
a congential condition.
The distinction between unity in the persistent and the
minimal sense of self refers to the spatial and temporal scale at
which unity is experienced. Based on the double dissociation
between, on the one hand, extreme dissociative personalities
(who have minimal but lack maximal selves) and Balint
syndrome patients (who have maximal but not minimal selves),
I propose that both may the product of distinct biological
mechanisms.
A further distinction is between ownership and content unity
(Welshon, 2013) In some epileptic patients, the corpus callosum
and other connectors such as the anterior commissure and
hippocampal commissure are cut through to reduce the severity
of seizures. This means there is hardly any communication
possible between the left and the right hemisphere. Meyers,
Sperry and Gazzaniga started to pursue the question how the
thus separated hemispheres function (Gazzaniga et al., 1962).
Among other things, these patients cannot name a familiar
object they are allowed to touch but not able to see, when
it is presented to their left hand. This is because they sense
the object in the right hemisphere, whereas their speech is
located in the right hemisphere. Despite their impairments,
callosal patients function normally under most circumstances.
Callosal patients still experience themselves as a single individual
(Gazzaniga, 1989); they have a perfectly normal sense of
ownership unity.
Schiffer et al. (1998) speculate that nevertheless, two separate
selves inhabit the hemispheres—but that the latter of these is
dominant. This, however, may appear too fanciful. According to
Gazzaniga (1989), the left hemisphere has the role of interpreting
the available information in terms of a self. This would imply that
the self is a narrative construction, in accordance with Dennett
(1992).
We could, however, maintain that the psychological
ownership unity is jointly maintained by the two hemispheres
even in cases where direct communication between them is
reduced. Most of these patients, after all, already had a unitary
self before they were lesioned. One notable case of a patient
who had the lesion congenitally was Kim Peek (Treffert and
Christensen, 2006). His may be a case of ownership unity that
is not biologically, but informationally based. In most normal
situations both hemispheres of split brain patients receive
plenty of same information through their senses. Foveal vision
goes to both hemispheres, most sounds are binaural, etc. Kim
Peek, however, was unusual in many respects; he had savant
syndrome, and could read two pages at the same time. His
brain had language centers in both hemispheres as well as
other anomalies. These anomalies might be strong enough to
consider the possibility that also his sense of self was different
from ours.
Whereas Welshon does not distinguish minimal sense of self
from ownership unity. However, I would like to distinguish
the two as in the laboratory of the psychologist, content
unity failure is commonly encountered with individuals who
have a perfectly normal (minimal and maximal) sense of
self. Peterson et al. used Necker cubes that were locally
disambiguated (Figure 1). When the disambiguated area is
overtly (Peterson and Hochberg, 1983) or covertly (Peterson and
Gibson, 1991) attended to, observers perceive the orientation
according to the local disambiguation. But when another,
unbiased area is attended to, the disambiguation fails to
influence the perceived orientation. Information of the parts,
therefore, is only loosely integrated with each other. Nevertheless,
we experience the cube as a unified whole. The minimal
unity of the self has no basis in the available visual
content.
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FIGURE 1 | Ambiguity in the Necker cube is not constrained by local
bias. Circles indicated by arrows represent alternative areas to which a prior
instruction draws attention. No arrows or circles were present in the actual
display. Area 1 contains an X-junction indicating an ambiguous cube; Area 2
contains a T-junction which yields a strong bias to the orientation of the cube.
When attention is drawn to Area 1, the cube reverses despite the presence of
a local disambiguation in Area 2. Adapted from van Leeuwen and Smit (2012)
after Peterson and Hochberg (1983).
As I argued elsewhere (van Leeuwen, 2007), this
phenomenon has a biological basis; it is readily explained
by the neurodynamics of the visual system. The conditions
in which it arises do not hold in general, but are restricted to
presentation in isolation, in combination with prolonged focused
attention to part of the figure. This results in a lack of global
coherence in the brain state, that prevents information from
becoming integrated. Under slightly more ecologically valid
conditions, involving the presence of a flanking context, these
modes still exist, but alternate with others that enable global
integration (van Leeuwen and Smit, 2012).
Whereas in Peterson’s studies participants keep their eyes
fixated on a single spot, in free viewing we fixate on certain
locations for 200–300 ms, after which our eyes move rapidly
to the next location by means of a saccade. Nevertheless, we
experience the external world as continuous across saccades. We
are usually not even aware of our eye-movements in exploring a
scene. Neither are we usually aware of our eyes blinking. In other
words, our minimal sense of self ignores the discontinuities in the
available visual content.
These phenomena, too, have their basis in the biology of the
visual system. Saccadic (and blink) suppression mechanisms
ensure that during saccadic eye-movements, the signal from
the eye is interrupted and cannot alert us to the change in
eye-position. Prior to the eye-movements, a shift in attention
takes place that offsets the selectivity in the receptive fields to
remain maximally position-invariant. It is clear, therefore, that
these mechanisms have adaptive significance. Without them, our
perceptual information would constantly suffer from disruptive
interference caused by our own oculomotor behavior.
Similar mechanisms play a role at higher levels of perception.
The high-level analog of blink suppression is the attentional
blink; the analog of saccade suppression is change blindness.
The origin of these phenomena in our perceptual system
are currently under study. See, for instance, (Bowman and
Wyble, 2007; Simione et al., 2012; Raffone et al., 2014) for
an integrative treatment of a range of these phenomena in
light of the architecture and dynamics of the visual/attentional
system.
Content unity failure is also ignored in our maximal sense of
self. Consider the persistent reasoning fallacies made famous by
Kahneman and Tversky (1996). They clearly illustrate that people
hold beliefs that are resistant against the logic they endorse. To
distinguish these states from beliefs, which are normally subject
to revision in face of contradictory evidence, Gendler (2008)
has called them ‘‘aliefs’’. According to Gendler, ‘‘to have an alief
is, . . ., to have an innate or habitual propensity to respond to
an apparent stimulus in a particular way. It is to be in a mental
state that is (in a sense to be specified) associative, automatic
and a rational. As a class, aliefs are states that we share with
non-human animals; they are developmentally and conceptually
antecedent to other cognitive attitudes that the creature may go
on to develop. Typically, they are also affect laden and action-
generating.’’ (p. 557). Examples are:a cinema-goer shrieking at
a horror-movie; reluctance to throw darts at a picture of a loved
one or for an avowed atheist to sign a pact with the devil. Aliefs,
thus, are entrenched epistemical states that are to large extent
immune against revision. Calling them entrenched suggests that
their origins are buried in the evolution of the brain, even if the
mechanisms may not be so easily identified.
According to Rosenthal (2001) and others, the psychological
unity of consciousness is based on higher-order thought.
Insofar thought involves reasoning rooted in belief, the various
dissociations in ownership and content unity offer plenty of
evidence that runs counter to this claim. We may, therefore,
propose that insofar unity is a thought, it is not rooted in belief,
but rather in something more akin to an alief. Aliefs are anchored
in biology, and therefore resilient against the various disunities in
the content of our everyday experience. This call for a biological
explanation of the mechanisms that enable ownership unity and
content disunity to co-exist, for which the notion of alief can only
be a placeholder.
In sum, content unity is not required for unity in the
minimal, nor in the maximal sense of self. This state of
affairs is related to the biology of our brain. That does not
mean the brain always lets people call the content of their
experience their own. Schizophrenics, for instance, claim to hear
voices. Presumably they mistake for other what is likely their
own inner speech. Anosognosia (failure to perceive ones own
disability), the different forms of unilateral neglect (failure to
attend to one half field or one side of an object), and dementia
(memory) are other pathologies where we may encounter
violation of maximal ownership unity. All these syndroms
clearly have a biological basis; for instance, brain lesions,
even if the precise mechanisms that lead to the symptom are
unknown. As for subtler symptoms, usually called ‘‘denial’’ or
sometimes ‘‘repressed psychological states’’, it is reasonable to
speculate that these are due to milder forms of the biological
mechanisms responsible for the clinical cases. Clearly, a deeper
understanding of the brain is required to see what enables
a healthy dialectic of ownership unity and content disunity,
as well as the various syndroms that emerge when it goes
wrong.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 6 April 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 170
van Leeuwen Agnosticist manifesto
Dynamical Representations
If ever I to the moment shall say: Beautiful moment, do not pass
away! Then you may forge your chains to bind me
—Faust, lines 1698–1701
We need to understand, however, what enables the experience
of unity and the absence of unity in experience to persist
within a single individual. I propose that this is a property of
brain activity and structure. Cognitive neuroscience has provided
ample support for content disunity, by seeking to confirm
hypotheses of functional specialization and localization in the
brain. Localized modules seem to work independently and in
parallel, only coupled through the signals that they pass through
to each other through their synapses. Thus the scientific view
seems slanted in favor of the conclusion that the experience of
unity is illusory. However, I will argue that certain brain states
occur at least intermittently that reveal a more global level of
organization. These are the biological basis for the experience
of unity.
What has led cognitive neuroscience to overlook these
functions. It has at its disposal two well-established methods
for studying brain activity: fMRI and EEG. Whereas the
former has great spatial resolution, this is lacking in the
second. Conversely, the first lacks the temporal resolution of
the second. As a result, fMRI has been preferably used for
studying the localization of function, while EEG for studying
its temporal aspects. This has helped strengthen the belief that
brain function can be studied in the spatial and temporal
domains independently. This, researchers localize static sources
in the brain with one method, and study the time course
of their activity with the other, thinking this is all there is
to the brain. However, this may be a mistake; important
characteristics of the brain signal are lost when ignoring their
spatiotemporal properties, such as traveling wave activity (Gong
and van Leeuwen, 2009; Alexander et al., 2013; Bressloff,
2014).
Traveling waves are organizions that occur globally, at the
scale of the whole head, both spontaneously during relaxed
wakefulness (Ito et al., 2005) and evoked by external stimulation
or self-initiated action (Alexander et al., 2013). Traveling
waves provide spatiotemporal unity by passing through, and
thus functionally connect, different local regions, modules,
or circuits.
Traveling wave activity has an important role to play in
neural signaling and communication, both at the circuit level
(Gong and van Leeuwen, 2009) and at the level of EEG (see
Alexander et al., 2013 for a review). Most importantly, it is
associated with global workspace activity; in particular with
global broadcasting and perceptual decision making (Nikolaev
et al., 2010). Wave duration corresponds to estimates of the
duration of the psychological present (Stroud, 1967). This may
suggest that whole-head traveling waves are a mechanisms to
effectuate and sustain the integration necessary for a minimal
sense of self.
Wave activity that has been associated with consciousness is
predominantly in the alpha and beta range, where alpha activity is
associated with rest (Lehmann, 1990); beta activity with actively
engaging the world (Nikolaev et al., 2010). Multiple different
patterns of brain activity can give rise to the same type of
event in experience, for instance the occurrence of a perceptual
switching in ambiguous figures (Nakatani and van Leeuwen,
2006; Nakatani et al., 2012). Traveling waves might be necessary
for experience of unity, they are by no means sufficient. Waves
occur during deep sleep (Massimini et al., 2004), epilepsia, and
prior to gestation; in other words, at times where we are typically
not conscious. They are a biological phenomenon with several
functions.
One of these functions could be relevant to the experienceof
unity in the maximal sense. Broadly speaking, brain activity
sustains the processes that together make up our mental life,
cognition, and behavior. In order to do so in an intrinsically
noisy system, brain activity needs to be geared towards stability;
yet instability is also needed, in order for the brain to efficiently
detach itself from a given process. This is why brain activity is
on-going. On-going brain activity is poised between stable states
(e.g., a global traveling wave) and periods of instability, where
the activity shows more localized and transient patterns. This
behavior is called itinerancy (Freeman, 2000; Kaneko and Tsuda,
2000). Such dynamics distinguishes the brain from devices
like artificial neural networks; these are geared towards stable
processes, from which only without external intervention can
detach them.
Brains, basically, are networks of diffusively coupled
nonlinear oscillators. In such systems, biological as well as
artificial ones, itinerant regimes are pervasive. But these do
not sustain any global activity pattern long enough to form the
basis of our maximal sense of unity. However, their activity may
support the evolution of a brain network structure that could
do this job. Activity (function) and connectivity (structure)
evolve in the brain on different time scales: fast activation
dynamics leads to slow, adaptive modifications in connection
strength (Skyrms and Pemantle, 2000) or structure (Gong and
van Leeuwen, 2003, 2004; Zimmermann et al., 2004). This
principle is re-iterated over multiple scales: there are multiple
mechanisms of structural change operating on different time
scales, and correspondingly, multiple time scales on which
activity is coupled to these mechanisms.
Gong and van Leeuwen (2003, 2004) proposed an extremely
simplified simple model in which ongoing, oscillatory activity has
the role of establishing a certain type of network connectivity
structure. The ongoing activation function leads to adaptive
rewiring of network structure according to the Hebbian principle
of ‘‘what fires together wires together’’. The structure, in
turn, helps sustain the function. The resulting symbiosis of
structure and function plays an essential role in explaining how
our development can manifest robust trends despite different
individual life histories, and may help identify the conditions
where it occasionally goes wrong.
The structures that emerge under the adaptive rewiring are
universally of the ‘‘modular small world’’ type (see Figure 2).
Small worlds are complex network structures that combine the
advantages of a high degree of clustering, which characterizes
regular networks, with the high degree of global connectedness
observed in random-networks (Watts and Strogatz, 1998).
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FIGURE 2 | A random network prior to (left) and after (right) several iterations of adaptive rewiring (From van Leeuwen, 2008).
Small world structures are optimally suitable for transfer of
information within a network (Latora and Marchiori, 2001).
It is therefore not surprising that small-world structures
feature in various domains of mental representation. The mental
lexicon, for instance, was shown to have small-world structure,
according to the graph of word co-occurrence in sentence
contexts (Ferrer I Cancho and Solé, 2001). The properties of this
structure influence the speed of retrieval from the mental lexicon
during recognition (Chan and Vitevitch, 2009) and production
of spoken words (Chan and Vitevitch, 2010), as well as long and
short term memory retrieval (Vitevitch et al., 2012).
The existence of these structures runs counter to the
influential claim by Fodor (1983) that cognitive systems cannot
at the same time be informationally encapsulated (i.e., clustered)
and globally well-connected and that, because of this, we
must distinguish between encapsulated input and a cognitive,
globally connected processing. Instead, the modular small-
worlds category offers both, enabling an integrative view of, for
instance, visual and cognitive processes.
Rather than perceptual and cognitive states being opposed to
one another, as Fodor (1983) concept of modularity suggests, a
small-world architecture of the brain would allow for different
modes of activity within the same system: perceptual activity
would correspond to regional waves confined to the clusters of
the perceptual system and operating in parallel or as cascades;
these could influence other clusters by global wave percolation.
The percolation would meet with waves emerging from different
sources and engage in at times collaborative, at times competitive
interaction. Some regional activity may prevail and capture the
system. This may explain, for instance, why a visual illusion may
prevail, even though we know of its illusory character.
That brain connectivity has the characteristics of a small world
is quite well-established (Sporns and Zwi, 2004; He et al., 2007;
Bullmore and Sporns, 2009; Bullmore and Bassett, 2011; Sporns,
2011; Gallos et al., 2012). Absence of small-world structure in
the brain is associated with brain pathologies such brain tumors
(Bartolomei et al., 2006), epilepsy (Ponten et al., 2007) and, in
particular, schizophrenia (Andreasen, 1999; Micheloyannis et al.,
2006; Rubinov et al., 2009a) and Alzheimer’s disease (Stam, 2004;
Stam et al., 2007; Frantzidis et al., 2014).
Already in its simplest version, the adaptive rewiring
principle explains how some anomalies found in Alzheimer’s
and schizophrenia patients may arise; in particular the
counterintuitive observation that schizophrenic patients suffer
from hyperglobality (Rubinov et al., 2009a). According to the
model, this is because under adaptive rewiring, the property
of clustering of connections is more vulnerable to aselective
network lesioning than global connectivity (van den Berg et al.,
2012).
Glazebrook and Wallace (2014), associate lesions to global
connectivity with autism spectrum disorders. It is highly
intriguing that some autism spectrum patients appear to share
some of the characteristics with Kim Peek (and some other
split-brain patients), even though clearly not autistic, including
an seeming inability to deal with non-literal speech, prodigious
attention to detail, and savant syndrome. Autism patients share
with simultagnosia patients an inability to perceive and interpret
the overall gestalt of a scene.
The mechanism these patients have in common may become
clear if we take (re)wiring costs into account. Jarman et al. (2014)
applied Gong and van Leeuwen’s adaptive rewiring approach, but
built in a preference for local connections (as global connections
are more costly). In this scheme, global connectivity is still
formed, but the clusters that emerge are predominantly local. If
the wiring costs are overweighted, the local clusters are hyper-
regular. In the brain, such extreme modularity may reinforce
local processes that interfere with the global communication.
Interestingly, underweighting the wiring costs makes the clusters
more diffuse; there are ectopic units in the clusters, something we
observe in dyslexic patients.
The property of modularity in small world networks (Rubinov
et al., 2009b) means the clusters interact via hubs. The hubs are
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specialized nodes or links that network evolution has given the
role of mediating information transfer between communities.
They synchronize, sometimes with one and sometimes with
another subsystem, and can be considered as agents of change
in the behavior of the regions to which they are connected.
The hubs and their interconnections may qualify as the
architecture of the global workspace, whereas the modules
they connect can be regarded as their client systems (see also
Glazebrook and Wallace, 2014 for a similar proposal).
Here, I would therefore propose that the symbiosis of brain
activity (traveling waves) and modular small-world architecture
constitute the biological substrate for our maximum sense of self.
Key is that the existence of different modules at various levels
allows the system to keep pieces of content separate and relatively
isolated from each other. The global connectivity implies that
these discrete contents can at times be integrated. Our brains
possess the conditions for both the disunity of conscious content,
and the persistent ownership unity.
Conclusions
As an antidote for the view that uor experience of unity is just
a convenient fiction, I offered the hypothesis that its basis lies in
the adaptive and dynamic mechanisms of the brain. I reached this
view without taking a phenomenological stance, nor studying the
brain from a first person perspective. I developed my view as a
case for agnosticism with respect to ‘‘what-is-it-likeness’’.
Agnosticism with respect to’’what-is-it-likeness’’ does not
constrain our efforts to study it. We may continue to address
the question of what are the grounds for ascribing conscious
experiences to ourselves, without presumptions about the
validity of doing so. We may speak of phenomenal content
in, for instance, a psychophysical, functional, or evolutionary
perspective. We may study experience in relation to particular
physical referents in the world (indirect psychophysics), in
the brain (direct psychophysics), in relation to attention
(Graziano, 2014), or as a product of optimization, learning,
development, adaptation, and evolutionary processes. We may
consider it a product of a global brain processes, such as
cortico-cortical synchronization (Crick and Koch, 2001) or
thalamo-cortical interactions (Edelman, 1992; Edelman et al.,
2011). We may seek for the origins of consciousness in our
biological evolution or that of our culture. We can treat
conscious experience as causally efficacious within the context
of these processes. For instance, having evolved the ability to
understand ourselves as conscious beings, we were ready to
express a moral understanding of our world, which further
continues to shape our existence in our living environment.
Thus, we may treat as given that we are living in a world
endowed with meaning and value that ultimately rest on our
phenomenal experience. None of this commits us to conscious
experience as anything other than as a particularly stubborn
belief, or alief.
But agnosticism does also invite us also to study certain
biological mechanisms that could, at least in principle, support
the validity of such beliefs, or aliefs. Some of these mechanisms
are specific: saccade and blink suppression secure the continuity
of our visual experience across perturbations from oculomotor
behavior. Some are more generic: traveling waves produce a
short-term unity in biological space-time as a pattern activity
moves over of the cortical sheet. These patterns have their own,
characteristic duration (Nikolaev et al., 2010) that corresponds,
roughly, to the psychological present (Stroud, 1967) and hence
they may be offered as a substrate for our minimal sense of self.
Moreover, they may help in establishing and maintaining the
architecture in the brain that can explain our maximal sense of
self: the persistent experience of unity in face of the disunity of its
content.
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